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Abstract 
 In modern elite theory accommodation and compromise between national elite 
groups are seen as preconditions for the continuance and stability of a democratic 
society. It is claimed that elite accommodation is facilitated to the extent that the 
elites are integrated. In this article trust between the various elite groups and their 
respective institutions is investigated as a core aspect of elite integration. Th e anal-
yses presented in the article demonstrate that in general there is a relatively high 
level of institutional trust among national elite groups in Norway. Th ere is, how-
ever, some variation in how much trust the various elite groups accord the institu-
tions to which other elite groups belong, and this is explained by (1) the extent to 
which one elite identiﬁes with the functions of other elites, (2) has a similar ideo-
logical orientation, and (3) has social contact with members of other elites. 
 Keywords 
 elites, elite integration, institutional trust 
 Introduction 
 Th e traditional elite theorists – Pareto, Mosca and Michels – contended 
that in any society there will be distinction between an elite of leaders and 
the masses, the led. As Higley and Burton (2006) have demonstrated, these 
theorists did not, however, claim that the elite always and everywhere will 
be unitary. On the contrary, Mosca (1939), for instance, stressed the vari-
ability of elite organization, cohesion and collective will. 
 Some decades later scholars within the “power elite” tradition (Mills 
1956; Porter 1965) maintained that the private and public elites in USA 
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and Canada were integrated to an extent that they constituted a single 
ruling group in society – a power elite. According to Mills (1956), the 
economic, political and military elites in USA were integrated through 
common class background and education and through family ties and 
belonging to the same social networks. 
 Th is research spurred an increased interest in studying whether national 
elites or particular sector elites are cohesive and integrated or, alternatively, 
whether they are fragmented (Domhoﬀ 1967; Putnam 1976; Hoﬀman-
Lange 1985; Higley et al. 1991; Kadushin 1995; Bürklin and Rebenstorf 
1997). 
 In contrast to the “power elite” theory, in more recent elite theory 
(Lijphart 1969a, 1969b; Presthus 1973; Putnam 1976; Higley and Burton 
1989) elites are rather described as institutionally distinct, socially dispa-
rate and politically diverse groups of national leaders. Mutual accommoda-
tion, compromises and consensus between these elite groups are seen as 
preconditions for the continuance and stability of democracies. In such a 
context “traditional” mechanisms of elite integration, as the ones focussed 
upon by Mills (1959), are less signiﬁcant. 
 In my analysis, using the same framework, elites are deﬁned as the hold-
ers of top positions in central institutions and organizations within 
signiﬁcant sectors of the Norwegian society, for instance the political sys-
tem, the economy and cultural life. As holders of leadership positions these 
elites act as representatives of the interests and concerns embodied in the 
particular institutions or organizations. Th ey have been delegated power to 
act on behalf of and are responsible to the principals of the individual 
institutions. Members of parliament are for instance responsible to the 
voters, senior civil servants to the elected politicians, union leaders to the 
union members, and private business leaders to the shareholders. Th rough 
processes of selection and socialisation the institutions and their principals 
see to that the persons entering the top leader positions are familiar with 
and have internalised the values and interests which the institutions are 
embodying. 
 Because the institutions stand for diﬀerent concerns and interests, the 
various elite groups are prevented from automatically converging into one 
single ruling group. 
 Under these circumstances some extent of elite integration is a prerequisite 
for arriving at accommodation and compromise between the institutionally 
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disparate elites. It becomes important then to focus upon those aspects of 
elite cohesion which motivate elites to enter into and stick to compromises 
with other elite groups. 
 Following Higley and Moore (1981), I argue in this paper that trust is a 
core aspect of elite integration. In line with this argument I examine to 
what extent the diﬀerent elite groups in the Norwegian society have 
conﬁdence in each other’s institutions. 
 In an earlier article, Gulbrandsen (2005a) focussed on the overall trust 
of the national elites in the most important private and public institutions 
in Norway. Th is study documented that many of the institutions receive 
relatively high trust by the elites. 
 Any high overall trust, indicating that the elites are integrated, may 
however, conceal situations where particular elite groups have low trust in 
signiﬁcant institutions. Instances of low institutional trust on the part of 
particular elite groups can create social tension and undermine the possi-
bility for compromise and national elite accommodation. Consequently, it 
is necessary to examine the structure of the trust relations between indi-
vidual elite groups and institutions. In this paper, therefore, an examina-
tion is made of the extent to which variations are found in the trust which 
the members of the various elite groups accord the institutions concerned 
together with an attempt to explain any variations observed. 
 Th ree factors or circumstances are discussed which may explain varia-
tions in institutional trust and accordingly in the extent of elite integration 
along this dimension: (1) the institutional aﬃliation of the top leaders and 
the signiﬁcance of the basic functions and interests of the institution or 
sector for their orientations and actions, (2) the leaders’ own ideological 
attitudes, (3) the extent of personal contact or interaction with top leaders 
in other institutions and sectors. 
 Th e hypotheses developed in this discussion are subsequently analysed 
empirically with the aid of data from a large and unique survey study of a 
sample of Norwegian economic, political and social elites, the Norwegian 
Leadership Study, undertaken in 2000. Th is study was an important part of 
the Power and Democracy Project, a ﬁve year project commissioned by the 
Norwegian parliament. Th e Leadership Study was conducted by Institute 
for Social Research in collaboration with Statistics Norway. 
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 Th e Case of Norway 
 Norway is an interesting case for three reasons. First, it is a high trust 
society. A recent study has demonstrated that Norway ranks highest in the 
world as to interpersonal or social trust (Delhey and Newton 2005). Th e 
high trust level is related to Norway’s Protestant tradition and ethnic 
homogeneity as well as good government, wealth and income equality. Th e 
citizens’ trust in the political institutions has traditionally also been quite 
high. Th eir trust in politicians is, however, approaching a rather low level, 
although this has been normal in many other industrial countries for some 
time (Strømsnes 2003). 
 Secondly, Norway is a stable democracy with roots back to the early 
nineteenth century. With the 1814 Constitution Norway acquired one of 
the most democratic systems in Europe. It is a society with striking egali-
tarianism, a strong public sector and an advanced welfare system. More-
over, there has been a widespread consensus on basic properties and norms 
of the Norwegian democracy. Th e consensus has grown out of previous 
class compromises, and compromises between opposing interest groups. 
Th e compromises were forged between the leaders of the various class and 
interest organisations or movements. In that sense, these compromises 
were elite compromises. 
 Th e elite compromises have a two-tier structure (Gulbrandsen et al. 2002). 
A compromise of the ﬁrst order is tied to the constitution, the emergence of 
parliamentarianism and the gradual accommodation of popular move-
ments into the polity. Th is culture of responsiveness by the elites is still 
basically intact. Compromises of the second order comprise the centralized 
system of wage negotiations and relative egalitarianism, the inclusion of 
women in the wage market and public aﬀairs, the regional policy of redis-
tribution, and the conduct of defence and foreign policy. 
 Th irdly, Norway has a particular variety of capitalism which partly 
explains Norway’s egalitarian and popular state policies and its universalis-
tic welfare system. Historically, the Norwegian economy lacked large, 
dominating ﬁrms in production and credit supply and the bourgeoisie has 
been weak, characterized by many small and medium-sized enterprises. In 
spite of a liberal orientation the State had to step in to safeguard the emerg-
ing industries, investing heavily in the infrastructure and assisting the 
establishment of a national banking system. Th e State had thus to com-
pensate for the absence of an ‘organized capitalism’ and became a senior 
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partner to private business. Th is model has been characterized by a leading 
historian as “democratic capitalism” (Sejersted 1993), a state dominated 
capitalism tempered by small-scale enterprises and strong norms of popu-
lar legitimation. 
 Th ese particular features of Norwegian society make Norway an inter-
esting case concerning integration and institutional trust within the 
national elite. Th e high-trust culture can be expected to give a fertile 
ground also for the elites’ trust in each other’s institutions. Th is trust has 
probably been strengthened by the widespread elite consensus and elite 
compromises. Also, the long tradition of public involvement in business 
may have fostered trust in the political institutions even among elite groups 
usually sceptical toward the State. 
 Th eory and Hypotheses 
 Elite Integration 
 In general, integration means that diﬀerent elements are combined into a 
whole, that a kind of unity is created among the elements. Elite integration 
thus implies that the diﬀerent elites are uniﬁed in one way or another. Th is 
unity is manifested in various ways: (1) as consensus on signiﬁcant values 
or on the desired properties of the society, (2) as subjective feelings or per-
ceptions of belonging to the same community, (3) as perceptions across 
diﬀerent elite groups of being complementary, i.e. that they are mutually 
dependent upon each other, (4) through instances of collective action and 
cooperation. 
 I suggest that widespread trust in the main institutions of a society is a 
signiﬁcant characteristic of elite unity. Institutional trust is a vital expres-
sion of both of an awareness of community and of complementarity. 
 Elite integration then has many dimensions, implying that a particular 
set of elites may be integrated along one dimension, but not necessarily 
along another. For instance, national elites can be integrated through insti-
tutional trust and general support for the democratic institutions and rules 
of the game, but at the same disagree about the size and scope of the wel-
fare state; or they are integrated through an extensive network of contacts 
and interaction, but still oppose each other on important ideological issues. 
It is diﬃcult to specify concrete criteria for determining whether national 
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elites or subsections of a particular elite group are integrated or not. Elite 
integration is a rather continuous (and composite) variable, i.e. the national 
elites are more or less integrated or united along the diﬀerent dimensions. 
 Institutional Trust 
 In an early analysis Deutsch (1962) deﬁned trust giving as acts which 
increase a person’s vulnerability to another person at the same time as the 
behaviour of this second person cannot be controlled by the ﬁrst one. 
According to Baier (1986) trust is present when a person accepts to be 
vulnerable to another person’s potential but not expected lack of good will. 
Oﬀe (1999) maintains that we have trust when we believe that another 
person will increase our welfare or abstain from hurting us. Th ese deﬁnitions 
illustrate that within the theoretical literature on trust there is a distinction 
between those contributions viewing trust as ﬁrst and foremost concrete 
acts and those focussing upon trust as beliefs or attitudes. 
 I deﬁne trust as an attitude on the part of one individual towards another 
individual, or towards an institution or a social system concerning the 
future behaviour of the other or the future outcome of relating to the par-
ticular institution. It involves an expectation that the other individual or 
the institution will execute or abstain from certain actions at a certain 
point of time in the near or distant future. One characteristic of situations 
where such an attitude emerges is that the trust-giver has no control of the 
future actions of the other part: there is a risk that the other’s behaviour 
will fall short of the trust-giver’s expectations. Another characteristic is that 
the trust-giver will suﬀer a noticeable loss if his or her expectations con-
cerning the behaviour of the other part are not met. 
 Since the elites relate to each other as representatives of particular insti-
tutions, their trust in each other is as much a trust in their respective insti-
tutions. Institutional trust embodies the belief that institutions have 
established mechanisms for guaranteeing that actions taken by their repre-
sentatives are binding for the institution as such. In this way institutional 
trust provides a basis for having trust in the promises made by the repre-
sentatives of the individual institutions. 
 Institutional trust bears witness to a perception on the part of the vari-
ous elite groups of national unity and a support for the basic institutions 
of society. Th is awareness of unity stimulates cooperation and compromise 
between the diﬀerent elites and helps them concert their actions to the 
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beneﬁt of all, the eﬀects of which are to reinforce the integration of the 
national elites. 
 Th ere are, however, reasons to believe that there are variations as to how 
much trust the various elite groups accord the individual institutions. On 
the level of the individual members of the elite groups there are three main 
sources of such variations: 
 (1) As emphasized above, the orientations and actions of the top leaders 
in the Norwegian society are aﬀected by, and reﬂect the institutions or sec-
tors which they represent. I suggest that the institutional aﬃliation of the 
elite persons also inﬂuences how they consider the trustworthiness of other 
institutions. 
 Social psychological belief-congruency theory (Rokeach et al.1960) 
claims that there is a natural tendency for people to associate with and be 
more comfortable with others having similar belief systems. Similar groups 
are assessed more favourably than dissimilar ones. Th is theory has been 
developed for explaining the prejudice and stereotype majorities hold 
about minorities. Delhey and Newton (2005) argue that this theory can be 
transferred to social trust: the greater the perceived similarity of other peo-
ple, the more they are trusted. Similarly, I suggest that one mechanism 
through which institutional aﬃliation may aﬀect the top leaders’ institu-
tional trust is identiﬁcation. Identiﬁcation implies an association of feeling 
or interest with another person or a group. Top leaders who work in insti-
tutions with similar basic functions will have a particular understanding 
for each other’s responsibilities, which may promote a mutual identiﬁcation 
between the involved leaders. Without personal experiences from a par-
ticular institution or with its representatives identifying with it/them 
nonetheless stimulates a feeling of familiarity which in itself may foster 
trust in the institution concerned. 
 I distinguish between four types of elite groups according to the basic 
function of their institution: (i) Social order elites, i.e. the military elite, 
top leaders within the police and the judges in the courts of justice and top 
leaders within the church; (ii) Intellectual elites, comprising the academic 
elite, the cultural elite and leading persons within the mass media; (iii) 
Political elites covering members of parliament, leaders of political parties, 
members of the cabinet, political leaders in the largest municipalities, and 
top leaders in state bureaucracy; (iv) Production elites, including top lead-
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ers within private business, public (state) business enterprises and within 
the cooperative sector. 
 I expect the trust between elite groups representing institutions with 
similar basic functions to be higher than between elite groups which have 
diﬀerent functions, i.e. such trust relations are to be expected within each 
of the groups of “social order”, “intellectual”, “political”, and “production” 
elites/institutions respectively. As an example, I expect that top leaders in 
the military services and the judges and top leaders within the police have 
more trust in each other’s institutions than in other elite groups. 
 But the responsibilities of the members of a particular elite group may 
also bring them in opposition to other institutions or to foster distrust in 
them. One example is the mass media elite. Mass media feel responsible 
for monitoring what is going on in the other institutions in society. Th ey 
watch and report any abuse of the power which leaders in these institu-
tions hold. Th is task instils into the members of the mass media elite a 
critical attitude towards society which may breed institutional distrust. 
 (2) It is reasonable to assume that the top leaders’ ideological beliefs 
inﬂuence the level of trust in the main institutions of society, independent 
of their institutional aﬃliation.1 For many individuals ideology is an 
important cognitive aid when attempting to orient themselves in a complex 
world. Th e same is probably valid for top leaders as well. By attaching labels 
of positive or negative value to particular institutions ideological beliefs 
then inﬂuence the top leaders’ cognitive/emotional process of trust giving. 
 Th e ideological controversies in Norwegian history, and up to the pres-
ent day, have particularly gravitated around the size and role of the state. 
Th e structure of the political parties in Norway has to large extent devel-
oped around the private/public issue. Moreover, citizens’ attitudes towards 
this private/public cleavage have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced how their votes 
have been cast in elections (Aardal 2003). 
 Th e Norwegian welfare state model is supported by a majority of the 
political parties and the members of the Norwegian parliament (“the Stort-
ing”). I therefore assume that elite groups whose members largely oppose 
this model “translate” their ideological dissatisfaction into lower trust in the 
political institutions. Among the Norwegian elites the top leaders within 
1) Studies of ordinary citizens have demonstrated that their institutional trust is signiﬁcantly 
related to their ideological orientation (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995).
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private business are the strongest opponents against the present authority 
and responsibilities of the state (Gulbrandsen 2005b). Accordingly, it is to be 
expected that the private business elite will appear with distinctly lower trust 
in the political institutions than the other elite groups. Conversely, I expect 
that elite groups which ideologically have much sympathy for the present 
welfare state model have relatively high trust in political institutions. 
 (3) According to general theories about trust (Blau 1964; Coleman 
1990), this gradually evolves and is extended the more frequently two indi-
viduals or partners see each other, and the longer their relationship lasts. In 
line with these ideas it is to be expected that a top leader’s trust in a particular 
institution will depend upon how much contact he or she has with the top 
leaders representing that institution. 
 Accordingly, I expect to ﬁnd that members of elite groups with frequent 
contacts with the top leaders in an institution will have more trust in the 
institution concerned than elite groups with less contact. An example of 
frequent contacts between two elite groups is the relationship between top 
leaders in the state administration and politicians in the Cabinet and the 
Storting. It is to be expected that politicians and senior public oﬃcials will 
also have a high degree of trust in each other’s institutions. 
 Data and Method 
 In the Leadership Study the sample of top leaders was constructed on the 
basis of a so-called “position” method., i.e. we included those persons who 
occupy the most important leadership positions in twelve sectors of Nor-
wegian society.2 Personal interviews were held with 1710 top leaders, 87.3 
per cent of those who were approached for an interview. 
 In the Leadership Study institutional trust was enquired into in the fol-
lowing manner: “How much trust do you have in the institutions listed on 
this card. Please rank the institutions on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is no 
trust and 10 is very high trust.”3 In this article the focus is upon the elites’ 
2) (1) Th e church, (2) the State administration, (3) culture, (4) mass media, (5) private 
business, (6) cooperative enterprises, (7) public business enterprises, (8) organizations, (9) 
universities and research institutes, (10) police and the judicial system, (11) military ser-
vices, and (12) politicians, i.e. members of the Storting, leaders of the political parties and 
members of the Cabinet and their political secretaries. 
3) Th e chosen formulation of the trust question covers the leaders’ generalized or diﬀuse
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trust in the following 13 institutions: (1) the Cabinet, (2) the political parties, 
(3) the Storting, (4) the courts of law, (5) the public administration, (6) the 
police, (7) the mass media, (8) the church and the religious organizations, 
(9) the trade unions, (10) private business, (11) voluntary organizations, 
(12) universities and research institutes, (13) the military services. Figure 1 
aggregates the trust of each of the twelve elite groups in all the thirteen 
institutions.4 
 As indicator of the leaders’ ideological orientation it is used a “public/
private” index including questions measuring the extent to which the indi-
vidual leaders endorse some main properties of the welfare state model.5 
 Th e leaders’ contacts with other top leaders in society were charted 
enquiring how frequently during the last year they had been in contact 
with a member of the various elite groups.6 
 As control variables in the analyses I have used (i) Education, a variable 
with 8 values according to educational level, (ii) Age as a continuous vari-
able, and (iii) Gender. 
 In order to test the hypotheses about which factors and circumstances 
inﬂuence the variations in the elites’ institutional trust it was carried out 
trust. Th e replies we have received must be seen as an aggregated or condensed judgment 
which may be founded upon several diﬀerent experiences, impressions and views held by 
the leaders. A particular top leader may have a trust or distrust for several diﬀerent reasons. 
Accordingly, there may be some variation between diﬀerent leaders in the emphasis 
expressed in their judgment. We know nothing, however, about the individual reasons for this. 
4) Th e information about the top leaders’ trust in their own institutions was taken out. 
5) We asked the leaders whether they agreed with the following four statements: (1) “It is 
more important to extend public services than to reduce taxes”; (2) “In Norway one should 
put stronger emphasis upon privatisation and a smaller public sector”; (3) “Th e state 
inﬂuence on private business should be reduced”; (4) “In Norway we have gone far enough 
in the reduction of income inequalities”. Th e answers were coded similarly. Th e index is 
based upon the mean of the leaders’ evaluation of the four statements and has values from 
1 to 4. Th e value 4 indicates that the leaders fully back the public sector and policies for 
levelling incomes. Th e value 1 indicates that the leaders favour a smaller public sector, more 
privatisation and a curtailing of the state power over private business. Cronbach’s alpha for 
the index is 0.83. 
6) A contact variable for each elite group was constructed, each with four values: “weekly or 
more frequently” (4), “monthly”, (3) “less frequently” (2) and “never” (1). In the models the 
variables were used as continuous variables. In the Leadership Study top leaders within the 
state administration were not asked about their contacts with the members of the Cabinet 
and the Storting.
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a series of statistical analyses relating the individual top leaders trust in 
each of ten selected institutions to the explanatory and control variables, 
cf. Tables 2 and 3.7  
 Results 
 Th e Leaders’ Trust in the Institutions of Society 
 Figure 1 presents the mean trust scores across all the thirteen institutions 
for each of the twelve elite groups, what we may term the general institu-
tional trust of the elite groups. Th e ﬁgure demonstrates that in general 
there is a relatively high level of institutional trust among the national elite 
groups in Norway. Given the particular trust fostering features of the Nor-
wegian society described above, I had expected, however, that the level of 
institutional trust was somewhat higher. Th e diﬀerences between the vari-
ous elite groups as to general institutional trust are small. None of the elite 
groups stand out from the other elite groups neither as to high nor low 
trust, in itself an indication of an extensive degree of integration among 
the elites in Norway. 
To explore the interrelations between the various elite groups and their 
respective institutions table 1 shows each elite group’s average trust in each 
of the thirteen institutions. Th e patterns which emerge in the table sup-
port several of the empirical expectations which were formulated above. 
As expected, the top leaders in the state administration constitute the 
elite group which has the highest trust in the political institutions – the 
Storting (6.8), the Cabinet (7.6) and the political parties (5.1). Th eir trust 
in the Cabinet is higher than what any other elite group has reported. Th is 
ﬁnding may be a result of what I described above as “identiﬁcation”. Th ey 
may identify with the basic responsibilities of the politicians in the Cabi-
net, and this identiﬁcation may in itself foster trust. Another possibility is 
that the top leaders reported high trust in the Cabinet because they had 
ideological sympathy with the political party which at the time of the
7) In each of these analyses I excluded those leader groups which are closely connected to 
the institutions concerned, i.e. (1) and (2) politicians and senior public oﬃcials, (3) politi-
cians, (4) senior public oﬃcials, (5) leaders in the police and the judicial system, (6) higher 
military oﬃcers, (7) leaders in the church, (8) top leaders in private business, and (9) national 
leaders in the trade unions. 
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 Figure 1
Average institutional trust within the various elite groups 
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interviews occupied the Cabinet – the Labour Party. But the ﬁnding may 
also be an indication of the relevance of the idea that frequent contact with 
a speciﬁc institution promotes higher trust in that institution. Finally, the 
initiatives and decisions taken by the Cabinet are usually based upon advice 
given by the civil service itself. Th e trust that the top leaders in the admin-
istration gives to the Cabinet is then as much a trust in their own work. 
 Below, I study the relative signiﬁcance of the various theories more thor-
oughly through multivariate statistical analyses of the trust attitudes of the 
individual top leaders. 
 For their part the politicians reciprocate the trust received by the senior 
public oﬃcials by giving the state administration relatively high trust (6.4), 
second only to the level of trust given by judges and top leaders within the 
police (6.9). 
 Also, as expected, the order institutions constitute a cluster of institu-
tions characterized by high mutual trust. Th e top oﬃcers in the military 
services accord the courts of justice and the police high trust (8.3 and 7.9
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respectively), while the leaders within the police and the group of judges 
on their part give more trust to the military services than any other elite 
groups (6.8). Th is pattern of high mutual trust between the members of 
the elite groups connected to the two order institutions is an indication of 
the signiﬁcance of the process of “functional” identiﬁcation for the devel-
opment of institutional trust. 
 Above, I suggested that top leaders within the mass media may be par-
ticularly critical of the other institutions. Table 1 lends support to this idea.
Th e table demonstrates that the mass media elite, but also the top leaders 
within the culture sector have in fact lower trust in the order institutions 
(the courts of justice, the military services and the police) and the church, 
than any of the other elite groups. Th e members of the two intellectual 
elites then seem to be less willing than other top leaders to accept the reasons 
for legitimacy traditionally pleaded by the order institutions and the church. 
 As expected, the members of the private business elite express reservations 
towards the political institutions. Not surprisingly, private business leaders 
have lower trust in the Cabinet and public administration than any other 
elite group, and second lowest trust in the Storting and the political parties. 
Th e diﬀerences to the other elite groups are, however, relatively small. In 
line with the discussion above this trust pattern may be related to the ideo-
logical beliefs of the private business leaders. Ideologically, the top leaders 
within private business are strongly in favour of reducing the size and 
responsibilities of the public sector and of allowing larger income inequal-
ities. Below I will examine whether their relative low trust in the political 
institutions is a reﬂection of these ideas. 
 Table 1 shows that the church leaders have lower trust in private busi-
ness than any other elite groups. Gulbrandsen et al. (2002) found that the 
church leaders ideologically represent a counterpart to the private business 
leaders. It is probable that this state of aﬀairs inﬂuences church leaders to 
place low conﬁdence in private business. On the other hand the private 
business leaders’ trust in the church is on a par with the other elite groups. 
 Table 1 reveals that the mass media receives much less trust from the 
other elite groups (on average 4.1) than leaders in the mass media on aver-
age give the other institutions in the society (5.9). In empirical studies of 
trust relations between individual citizens it has been found that individu-
als who are met with low trust react by reducing their own trust in other 
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persons. It is noticeable that this social psychological mechanism does not 
seem to be operative among the top leaders in the mass media. In spite of 
the low trust they receive from the other elite groups, they continue to 
have a general institutional trust on a level similar to these groups. Th e 
leaders within the mass media are probably well aware of the costs of their 
role as watchdogs in the society and accept that low trust is the price they 
have to pay for meeting the requirements of this role. 
 Factors Explaining the Variations in the Elite Groups’ Institutional Trust 
 Table 1 demonstrates that there are distinct variations between the elite 
groups as to how much trust they accord each of the other institutions. 
Moreover, the ﬁndings also seem to lend support to the hypotheses dis-
cussed in the theoretical section above. Th e simple descriptive analysis in 
Table 1 is not suﬃcient however for conﬁrming or refuting the hypotheses. 
A more satisfactory statistical basis for determining the relative merit of the 
three explanations of the variations in the elites’ institutional trust is pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3. Th ese tables present the results of regression 
analyses where the variations in the individual top leaders’ trust in each of 
ten of the institutions are related to the three explanatory variables. 
Table 2 
Th e individual top leaders’ trust in political institutions. Regression 
analyses (OLS). Non-standardized estimates 
Trust in the 
Storting
Trust in the 
cabinet
Trust in 
the public 
administration
Trust in 
the political 
parties
Intercept 4.839** 4.549** 5.23** 3.609**
Ideological 
orientation: the 
private/public cleavage
0.325** 0.374** 0.381** 0.368**
Contact with leaders in 
the respective 
institutions
0.149* 0.225** 0.223** 0.167**
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Table 2 (cont.)
Trust in the 
Storting
Trust in the 
cabinet
Trust in 
the public 
administration
Trust in 
the political 
parties
Elite group (reference 
group: private 
business leaders):
Leaders in the 
Church
 0.406 –0.241  0.090  0.286
Leaders in the state 
admin.
 0.686**  1.135**  0.474**
Leaders in culture 
institutions
–0.068 –0.095  0.177 –0.035
 Leaders in mass 
media
–0.227  0.079 –0.305 –0.033
Leaders in 
cooperative 
enterprises
 0.246  0.0005  0.001 –0.197
Leaders in public 
enterprises
–0.284  0.911**  0.789**  0.232
Leaders in 
voluntary org.
 0.154  0.193  0.474**  0.136
 Leaders in research 
institutes and 
universities
 0.052  0.286  0.506**  0.010
Leaders in police 
and courts of 
justice
 0.019  0.320  1.112** –0.346*
Leaders in the 
military services
 0.329  0.489**  0.099  0.171
Politicians  0.773**
Controlled for age, edu-
cation and gender
Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 adjusted  0.05  0.08  0.13  0.06
N 1386 1388 1488 1490
** Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.
Source: Th e Norwegian Leadership Study 2000.
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Table 3
Th e individual top leaders’ trust in other institutions. Regression analyses 
(OLS). Non-standardized estimates 
Trust in 
the courts 
of law 
Trust in 
the police 
Trust in 
private 
business 
Trust in 
the 
military 
services 
Trust in 
the 
church
Trust in 
the mass 
media 
 Intercept  6.818**  6.521**  7.189**  4.354**  2.498**  4.330*** 
 Ideological 
orientation: the 
private/public 
cleavage 
 
−0.001 
 
−0.130** 
 
−0.479** 
 
−0.167** 
 
−0.311** 
 
 0.131* 
 Contact with 
leaders in the 
respective 
institutions 
 
 0.194** 
 
 0.257** 
 
 0.123** 
 
 0.321** 
 
 0.898** 
 
 0.237** 
 Elite group 
(reference group: 
private business 
leaders): 
      
 Leaders in the 
Church 
 −0.382*  −0.125  −0.701**   0.170   −0.870** 
 Leaders in the 
state admin. 
 0.330*  0.004  −0.445*  −0.053  −0.234  −0.610** 
 Leaders in 
culture 
institutions 
 −0.431**  −0.490**  −0.501*  −0.565**  −0.623**  −0.565** 
 Leaders in 
mass media 
 −0.634**  −0.964**  −0.593*  −0.738**  −0.791**  
 Leaders in 
cooperative 
enterprises 
 0.201  0.163  0.441  0.263  0.495  −1.203** 
 Leaders 
in public 
enterprises 
 0.093  −0.082   −0.231  −0.366  −1.044** 
 Leaders in 
voluntary org. 
 −0.105  −0.227  −0.419  −0.127  −0.341  −0.720** 
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Table 3 (cont.)
Trust in 
the courts 
of law 
Trust in 
the police
Trust in 
private 
business
Trust in 
the 
military 
services 
Trust in 
the 
church
Trust in 
the mass 
media 
 Leaders in 
research 
institutes and 
universities 
 −0.059  0.243  0.440**  −0.193*  −0.758**  −0.838** 
 Leaders in 
police and 
courts of 
justice 
   −0.655**   0.357*  0.408  −1.041** 
 Leaders in the 
military 
services 
  0.082  0.441*  −0.321   0.069  −0.469* 
 Politicians  0.218  0.234  −0.211  0.529**  0.308  −0.834** 
 Controlled for 
age, education 
and gender 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 R2 adjusted  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.06  0.15  0.05 
 N  1544  1545  1380  1490  1555  1681 
 ** Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level. * Signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. 
 Source: Th e Norwegian Leadership Study 2000.
 Th e ﬁndings presented in the two tables conﬁrm ﬁrst of all that variations 
in the top leaders’ institutional trust are signiﬁcantly related to the sector 
or institution to which they belong. Th is result supports the theoretical 
idea which was advocated above, that institutional aﬃliation signiﬁcantly 
aﬀects the attitudes, in this case the trust of the elite persons. 
 In the theory section I suggested that one mechanism by which institu-
tional aﬃliation inﬂuence the top leaders’ trust in other institutions is 
identiﬁcation: the members of an elite group identify with other elite 
groups who have similar basic function as their own group. I hypothesized 
that this identiﬁcation may promote trust in the institutions concerned. 
In line with this hypothesis Table 2 demonstrates that when controlling 
for ideological orientation the top civil servants have more trust in the 
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Storting, the Cabinet and the political parties than the other elite groups. 
Th eir trust is not then not due to any ideological sympathy with the polit-
ical party holding power at the time of the interviews.8 Similarly, the mem-
bers of military elite have signiﬁcantly more trust in the police, also an 
order elite group, than the other elite groups; and on their part the police 
leaders and judges have high trust in the military services. 
 Th e preceding interpretations are, however, somewhat weakened by the 
fact that the political elite has no more trust in the public administration 
than the other elite groups, and the military elite has no more trust in the 
courts of justice than the other elites. 
 Tables 2 and 3 indicate that other aspects of the elite groups’ functions 
also aﬀect their trust evaluations. As shown in Table 1 also, the mass media 
and the culture elites in particular have signiﬁcantly lower trust in the police, 
the military services and the private business, even when controlled for 
their ideological orientation and their frequency of contact with the insti-
tutions. Th e idea elites are also negative in their evaluation of the trustwor-
thiness of the church. As indicated above, these ﬁndings probably reﬂect the 
role as critical institutions which the mass media and the culture occupy. 
 Secondly, and as expected, institutional trust is also signiﬁcantly related 
to the ideological orientation of the groups’ members. Th e more the 
members of an elite group support the present welfare state model of 
Norway, the more trust they have in the public administration and the less 
trust in private business and in the church. On the other hand, this ﬁnding 
implies that the stronger the opposition by an elite person to the state 
model, the less trust its members have in the public administration and the 
more trust in private business (and the church). 
 Above, I discussed whether the private business leaders’ lower conﬁdence 
in the political institutions, relatively to the other elite groups, might be a 
result of their negative ideological attitudes towards the public sector. In 
order to follow up this idea I have carried out a separate set of analyses (not 
reported here) checking whether the eﬀect on political trust of belonging 
to the business elite group is aﬀected by introducing the business leaders’ 
8) Unfortunately we cannot control for the frequency of contact with members of the 
Cabinet and the Storting, cf. note 6. Th e analysis of the trust of the senior state oﬃcials in 
the political parties is, however, controlled for the frequency of contact with top leaders in 
the political parties. 
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individual ideological views. Th e results of the analyses conﬁrm that the 
business leaders’ trust towards the political institutions to some extent is 
explained by their more conservative ideological attitudes. However, even 
when controlling for ideological outlook there remains a signiﬁcant (nega-
tive) statistical relationship between being a member of the business elite 
and trust in the Storting, the Cabinet and the public administration com-
pared to being a member of some of the other elite groups. Th eir relatively 
lower trust in these institutions is then not only a result of their ideological 
stance, but is probably related also to other aspects of the business elite’s 
culture and world views. 
 Within the research on citizens’ conﬁdence in the political institutions 
it has been discussed whether their attitudes are inﬂuence by how satisﬁed 
they are with the economic and political performance of the government 
(McAllister 1999; Miller and Listhaug 1999). In line with this discussion 
it is possible that the private business leaders’ more sceptical attitude 
towards the political institutions is caused by a discontent with the con-
crete public beneﬁts accruing to themselves. I have attempted to follow up 
this idea using data from the Leadership on the top leaders’ lobby activi-
ties. Th ey were asked whether (and how) they last year had attempted to 
inﬂuence the outcome of a political decision which was vital to their orga-
nization or company. Th ey were also requested to report whether they were 
satisﬁed with the outcome of their lobby actions. I have carried out separate 
analyses (not reported here) where I have related the business leaders’ politi-
cal trust to their evaluation of the result of the lobbying. It appeared to be no 
signiﬁcant relationship between these two variables, indicating that the busi-
ness leaders’ trust attitudes are not primarily based upon their perceptions of 
any positive or negative outcome of relating directly to the political system. 
 It is surprising that the elite groups which are the most eager proponents 
of the welfare state accord the church less trust than other elite groups. Th e 
relatively negative evaluation of the church expressed by these elite groups 
may be a reaction to the conservative role that the church traditionally 
used to have in the Norwegian society and the conservative attitudes which 
previously prevailed within the church. But this situation implies that the 
elite groups which are sceptical to the church have failed to notice the changes 
of mentality and ideology that have been going on within the church. Th ey 
have missed the fact that the top leaders in the church today appear as one 
of the most radical elite groups in the Norwegian society. 
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 Th e tables also oﬀer evidence for the linkage between the frequency of 
contact that elite persons have with top leaders in another institution and 
their trust in this institution, i.e. top leaders who see each other frequently 
develop more trust in each other’s institutions than elite groups with less 
frequent contact. 
 Th e politicians emerged as an elite group which exhibit slightly more 
general institutional trust than the other elite groups. Th e diﬀerence is, 
however, not signiﬁcant. Th is ﬁnding is nonetheless interesting when 
related to some other results from the Leadership study. In another paper 
I have reported that the members of the politic elite are less apprehended 
of populism and political indiﬀerence among the voters, and they report 
less frequently worries about too weak political parties and the power of 
the government (Gulbrandsen 2005c). Both this more “laid-back” attitude 
and their general institutional trust are consistent with studies of politi-
cians’ tolerance (Sullivan et al.1993) and with theories of political social-
ization (Sullivan et al 1993; Searing 1986). Several studies have documented 
that politicians are more tolerant for instance towards extremist groups 
than the general public. To a certain extent this has been explained by 
selective recruitment. Individuals recruited to politics have psychological 
and social properties which foster greater tolerance. As Sullivan et al. 
(1993) have demonstrated, this is not a suﬃcient explanation. Th ey claim 
that the tolerance of the politicians also is a result of the gradual political 
socialization of political recruits before they enter the main positions in the 
political system. Politicians are exposed to more ideological variation and 
learn the necessity of political compromise both of which instil in them a 
more realistic and less dramatic image of the potential threats of non-
conformist groups and their ideas. Th e experience of having to take politi-
cal responsibility and consider the consequences of ones actions inhibits 
them from intolerance of others. Moreover, central politicians acquire a 
sense of personal control which also may be favourable to the development 
of political tolerance. 
 Th ese mechanisms of political socialization may also explain why Norwegian 
politicians more frequently have trust in the main institutions in the society 
and a more relaxed view upon populism and voter indiﬀerence. 
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 Summary and Conclusions 
 Elites in a modern democracy are to a large extent elected and employed 
leaders of large institutions and organizations. Th ey are expected to repre-
sent and take care of the interests of the principals of their respective insti-
tutions and organizations. Living up to this responsibility necessitates that 
the members of the individual elite groups cooperate, negotiate and enter 
into compromises with the representatives of the other elite groups in soci-
ety. In previous elite research it has been claimed that this kind of elite 
accommodation is facilitated to the extent that the various elites are inte-
grated. In this paper I have argued that trust is an important characteristic 
of such elite integration. 
 Following up this theoretical idea I have set out to examine the extent 
to which important elite groups in the Norwegian society have trust in 
each other’s institutions. I have also attempted to discuss how variations in 
institutional trust between the various elite groups and their members can 
be explained. 
 Th e analyses presented above have demonstrated that the general level 
of institutional trust is about the same in the diﬀerent elite groups. None-
theless, the elites appeared as less enthusiastic about the trustworthiness of 
the Norwegian institutions than expected. 
 Th ere are, however, interesting variations as to how much trust the indi-
vidual elite groups accord the various institutions. Th e top leaders within 
private business elite stand out with less trust in the political institutions than 
the other elite groups. At the same time private business as an institution 
is given relatively low trust by the other elite groups. Th e church leaders 
have less trust in private business than all the other national leaders. Th e 
top civil servants distinguish themselves by having more trust in the political 
institutions compared to the other elites. Th e two order elites, the top 
oﬃcers in the military services and the top leaders within the police, have 
more trust in each other’s institutions than the rest of the elite groups. Top 
leaders within the mass media and the cultural sector for their part emerged 
as being particularly sceptical towards the order institutions and the 
church. 
 Th e analyses indicate that top leaders’ evaluation of trust is aﬀected by 
the extent of which they identify with the functions of the individual insti-
tutions. To a certain extent the patterns of trust between elite groups and 
institutions are attributable to the ideological orientation of the members of 
the various elite groups and to their contact with the institutions concerned. 
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 Th e distrust expressed by the mass media and culture elites, particularly 
in the order institutions, cannot however, be explained by any of these 
three factors. Th eir distrust illustrates that the elites’ institutional trust may 
be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by basic orientations and responsibilities which are 
speciﬁc for the particular institutions and which are not necessarily 
inﬂuenced by the private attitudes, characteristics and experiences of the 
individual leaders. 
 Against the background of the business leaders’ right wing ideological 
orientation, I had expected that they also distinguished themselves as less 
integrated in the trust structure than the other elite groups. Admittedly, 
private business receives relatively little trust from the other elites groups, 
and the business leaders on their part express less trust in the Cabinet and 
public administration than the other top leaders. Th e diﬀerences are, how-
ever, modest. Th is ﬁnding is in contrast to what Vogel (1978) some years 
ago observed in USA. Vogel described the private business leaders as an 
elite group which had very little faith in the state and the public sector. 
Accordingly, the Norwegian business leaders seem to be less in an “outsider” 
position concerning institutional trust than their colleagues in USA. 
 Th e mass media are characterized by receiving distinctly lower trust than 
other institutions. Th is situation should not, however, be seen as an evi-
dence of the mass media elite being an outcast among the national elites in 
Norway. Th e low trust which the mass media is accorded is probably caused 
by a discontent on the part of these elites both with the pressing and criti-
cal scrutiny of the mass media and with their power to direct the political 
agenda. Nonetheless, there is a general recognition of the basic role and 
function of the mass media. Th e mass media as an institution is thus well 
integrated into the Norwegian society. 
 Th e relatively low standing of the mass media within the “trust struc-
ture” may illustrate a more general idea within the elite theory. Both Ray-
mond Aron (1968) and Schmuel N. Eisenstadt (1966) have emphasized 
that democracy is dependent upon a balance between elite unity and elite 
independence. To Aron, an integrated elite would end freedom, while a 
fragmented elite would undermine the state. Similarly, Eisenstadt claimed 
that the success of democracy rested on two seemingly contradictory con-
ditions: a diﬀerentiation between the elites which could open up for com-
petition between alternative power centres, and a consensus between the 
elites about the basic values and rules of the game. From such a perspective 
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the independent and critical role of the mass media is a signiﬁcant prereq-
uisite for democracy, even if it is accompanied by low trust shown by the 
other elite groups in society. 
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